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Medium-terms shifts in the structure of world demand affect the sectoral composition of domestic 
output, trade and employment. A sustained reduction of global current-account imbalances 
implies a decline in the share of household consumption in aggregate demand in the United States 
and the opposite development in China. The net effect of these adjustments for the world economy 
would be deflationary and yet insufficient for the unwinding of global imbalances. It would also 
cause sizeable adverse employment impacts in the world economy as a whole. A multilaterally 
coordinated rebalancing that would also include an increase in the share of household 
consumption in aggregate demand of developed country surplus economies would reduce these 
adverse effects. Apart from the countries undertaking rebalancing, developing countries in East 




The persistently large imbalances in the world economy – with sizeable current-account deficits in 
some countries, particularly the United States, and sizeable current-account surpluses in others, 
notably Germany, Japan, developing countries in East Asia, especially China, and a number of oil-
exporting countries – contributed to the outbreak of the current economic and financial crisis and 
facilitated its global spread.
1 While global imbalances declined in the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis, they have been widening again with the ongoing recovery of the world economy. Global 
current-account imbalances are not necessarily undesirable. However, there is widespread agreement 
that the current imbalances are unsustainable.
2 Hence, a smooth and non-deflationary reduction of 
global imbalances is indispensable not only for ensuring that the recent global economic upturn 
 
                                                 
1 Financial excesses were the eventual trigger of the global financial crisis. However, these excesses would most 
probably not have developed to the same extent if the macroeconomic environment had not been characterized 
by large saving-investment imbalances and asset price misalignments. These factors exerted enormous pressure 
in the United States and the global financial markets where the development of new complex financial 
instruments and regulatory failures had progressively introduced serious systemic flaws. Regarding the 
propagation of the financial problems that initially had been confined to the United States financial markets, only 
a much broader set of interrelated factors, including macroeconomic in addition to purely financial elements, 
could have been responsible for generating a crisis of these proportions. 
2 The recent accumulation of global imbalances has generally been judged as undesirable not only because of 
their size but mainly because of the unsustainability of the factors behind them, particularly the massive increase 
in often debt-financed household consumption in the United States.   2 
continues but also for minimizing the risk of recurrent global economic turmoil. This paper examines 
the effects on trade flows and employment that global rebalancing might entail. 
A correction of current-account imbalances and – their domestic mirror image – the savings-
investment disequilibria will change the structure of world demand and affect the sectoral composition 
of domestic output, trade flows and employment. These changes are driven by: (i) the per capita 
income levels of those countries that make the greatest contribution to world aggregate demand 
growth; and (ii) the income distribution in rapidly growing economies and its attendant impact on the 
role of household consumption in domestic demand growth. These mechanisms are global in scope, 
covering developed and developing countries, but the paper focuses on the two main protagonists in 
this story – China and the United States.
3 
Adopting this bipolar perspective appears useful for several reasons. First, the United States and China 
have accounted for sizeable shares of global imbalances (the United States for about 45 per cent of 
deficits and China for about 25 per cent of surpluses, respectively, in 2008, i.e. the year when the sum 
of individual countries’ absolute current-account positions reached a post-war peak of over 5 per cent 
of global GDP (de Mello and Padoan, 2010)). Second, the recent growth trajectories of the United 
States and China appear to have developed in opposite directions. Consumption as a share of GDP 
increased in the United States but fell in China; investment rose dramatically in China while its 
importance shrunk in the United States; and China’s trade surplus sharply contrasted with the 
substantial deficit in the United States. Thus the United States current-account deficit has been 
associated with a low national savings rate and a continuously rising share of private consumption in 
GDP, while along with China’s current-account surplus there has been a very high national savings 
rate and a very low share of household consumption in GDP. However, the external position of neither 
of these two countries is sustainable. Regarding the United States, unless another asset bubble occurs, 
there is no alternative to de-leverage debt-financed household consumption, and in China, the need to 
embark on a major structural transformation from investment- and export- to consumer-led growth has 
been officially recognized.
4 
The main questions addressed in this paper are: (i) how, in the 5-year period before the current crisis 
began, buoyant consumer demand in the United States and the relative slow expansion of household 
consumption that accompanied vigorous aggregate growth in China influenced per capita output 
growth, world trade and employment; and (ii) what would happen to the level and sectoral structure of 
world trade and employment if the shares of consumption in GDP in the United States and China went 
back to their historic trends. This set-up is of course simplistic because of lagged effects, path 
dependence and irreversibility (for example, de-leveraging bad household debt does not simply mean 
reversing savings ratios), but seems well-suited to indicate the direction of changes and a general idea 
of the magnitudes involved. 
Section 2 examines the development of consumption spending in China and the United States. 
Section 3 looks at the trade impact of household consumption in these two countries and tries to 
determine which countries’ consumer demand could make up for a decline in United States household 
consumption. It argues that China’s consumer good imports are both too small and too different from 
that of the United States to be able to compensate the adverse effects of a sizeable decline in United 
States consumer spending on global consumer good imports. Developed surplus economies, notably 
Germany and Japan, would be better placed to do so. Section 4 examines development in sectoral per 
capita output growth, trade and employment during the 5-year period in the build-up to the current 
crisis when global imbalances were accumulating rapidly. Section 5 simulates the effects on global 
trade flows and sectoral employment shifts that re-balancing in the United States and China is likely to 
imply. It shows that the net effect of rebalancing confined to China and the United States for the world 
 
                                                 
3 For a general discussion of the issues involved in moving from a current-account surplus to a more balanced 
external position, see IMF, 2010. 
4 See China’s 11
th Five Year Plan enacted in 2006.   3
economy would be deflationary and yet insufficient for the unwinding of global imbalances. 
Moreover, it would probably cause sizeable adverse employment impacts in the world economy as a 
whole. A multilaterally coordinated rebalancing that would also include an increase in the share of 
household consumption in aggregate demand of developed country surplus economies, especially in 
Germany, would reduce these adverse effects. The concluding section 6 stresses that a global 
rebalancing requires a multilaterally coordinated approach and raises some questions about the 
sustainability of the export-led development strategy in East and South-East Asia. Much of this 
strategy has been based on the participation in value chains in which these countries produce 
intermediate goods that are finalized in China for export to the United States. Global rebalancing may 
well reduce the production and export opportunities that these value chains have offered. As a result, 
developing countries in East and South-East Asia may need to follow economic rebalancing in China 
and reorient their development strategy towards a greater role of domestic demand as well. 
II. CONSUMPTION SPENDING IN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
There are three main views on the causes of global imbalances and policies to correct them (for 
surveys see Mann, 2002 and Yu, 2007). A first international perspective emphasizes the flows and 
holdings of financial assets and views current-account balance as being determined by the portfolio 
choices of private financial investors and official reserve holders that drive international capital flows. 
The most popular expression of this perspective has been the “savings glut” hypothesis (Bernanke, 
2005). A second international perspective focuses on flows of trade in goods and services. Exchange 
rates play a key role in this perspective, in particular alleged “currency manipulation” by China for 
maintaining an undervalued renminbi. A, third, national perspective examines national income and 
product accounts, focusing on savings and investment, and sees the current account as driven by 
national savings-investment imbalances. Contrary to the previous perspective, it sees trade flows 
driven mainly by relative demand factors, rather than just by relative prices. In other words, it sees 
international trade in goods and services as responding, in a relatively passive fashion, to domestic 
demand factors as reflected in national accounts. Cross-country differences in the rate of economic 
growth play an important role in this perspective.
5 
Each of these three perspectives provides a different basis for analysis, and one or the other 
perspective may be particularly useful for certain circumstances or time frames. This paper adopts the 
third perspective which implies that an effective rebalancing of the United States savings-investment 
balance cannot occur without interrupting the secular decline in its saving rate or, what is equivalent, 
the secular increase in its consumption rate, and that the opposite holds for surplus countries. 
A. United States consumption spending 
The secular decline in the United States household savings rate since the beginning of the 1980s went 
hand in hand with a rapid expansion of private consumption. Since the late 1990s, the share of 
personal consumption in GDP has considerably exceeded its average long-term trend of about 66 per 
cent, reaching a peak in early 2009, when it accounted for 71 per cent of GDP (figure 1). 
 
                                                 
5 See annex 2 for further discussion of these three perspectives.   4 
More importantly, the increase in United 
States household consumption was largely 
debt financed. Facilitated by easy consumer 
credit, lax lending standards, a proliferation 
of exotic mortgage products, the growth of a 
global market for securitized loans and 
soaring house values, burgeoning household 
spending created strongly growing household 
debt and led to a sharp decline in the United 
States household savings rate to almost zero.
6 
The ratio of debt to personal disposable 
income reached an all-time high in 2007, 
exceeding 130 per cent. As a result, 
household leverage was 27 percentage points 
above where it would have been had it 
maintained its 1975–2000 trend (figure 2). 
This difference, which corresponds to about 
$2.8 trillion, indicates the potential magnitude 
of United States household deleveraging that 
could be achieved through debt reduction and 
increased savings. 
The increase in private consumption was 
unsustainable because it was not supported by 
a similar expansion of labour compensation 
in the private sector. Compared to previous 
upswings, the economic expansion that ended with the onset of the current crisis had been 
characterized by a low increase in employment and by the relative stagnation of real wages. As a 
result, private sector labour compensation grew at an unusually sluggish pace and fell short by more 
than $800 billion (in real terms) relative to the trajectory of the previous four business cycles (Roach, 
2009: 14). Low- and middle-income households that intended to maintain their relative standards of 
consumption thus turned from income- to debt-financed expenditure. While the share of consumer 
credit in disposable personal income oscillated around an average of about 18 per cent between the 
mid-1960s and the mid-1990s, it reached a peak of over 25 per cent in the 2000s due to an average 
annual rate of growth of consumer credit of 8 per cent between 1992 and 2006 (Barba and Pivetti, 
2009: 115). Low interest rates, asset price inflation (first for equities and then for housing) and 
financial deregulation permitted this shift from wage to non-wage income (i.e. income from property 
and government transfers) and loans as the sources of purchasing power, used increasingly by low- 
and middle-income households. Resort to non-wage income allowed households to maintain the share 
of disposable personal income in GDP at around 74 per cent, despite the long-term decline in the share 
of labour compensation in GDP since the early 1980s (interrupted by only a brief upswing in the late 
1990s) (figure 2). Efforts to maintain relative standards of consumption, despite sluggish growth in 
labour compensation, led many households to lower their savings or increase their debts, causing a 
marked fall in the household savings rate.
7 
 
                                                 
6 Glick and Lansing (2010) show that large increases in household leverage (as measured by the ratio of debt to 
disposable personal income) and the housing bubble were not unique to the United States; they also occurred in 
other developed countries. 
7 For further discussion on the development of income inequality and the relationship between income 
distribution and the maintenance of relative, rather than absolute, standards of consumption in the United States, 
see Barba and Pivetti, 2009. 
Figure 1 
PERSONAL CONSUMPTION IN  
THE UNITED STATES, 1950–2010 
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Average, 1975–2000
Source: Author’s calculations, based on the United States 
Bureau of Economic Analysis database. 
Note:  The observations are based on quarterly data. Data 
for 2010 refer to the first quarter.   5
In the final two quarters of 2008, real 
personal consumption expenditure fell 
sharply, marking a departure from the trend 
of a steady increase in the consumption rate 
since the 1980s. Thereafter, it picked up 
again, but this is most likely due to the one-
off effects of transfers related to various 
government programmes such as the “cash-
for-clunkers” programme, food stamps and 
extended unemployment benefits, as well as 
tax cuts. This suggests the recovery is only 
temporary. Indeed, there is good reason to 
believe that the decline in household 
consumption as a share of GDP has only just 
begun. It has fallen by only about one 
percentage point from its peak of 71.5 per 
cent and, thus, remains about five percentage 
points above its pre-bubble average of 66 per 
cent during the period 1975–2000. The 
decline in asset prices and the associated 
wealth effects for households, a sharp 
tightening of credit availability and a large 
increase in unemployment risk are widely 
expected to have a lasting downward impact 
on household spending. According to recent 
estimates (Lee, Rabanal and Sandri, 2010: 3), 
the current changes in the respective shares of 
household consumption and savings in total 
income are likely to settle at the levels of the 
early 1990s, which “implies a significantly 
lower share of private sector demand in GDP 




B. China’s consumption spending 
Private consumer spending in China is low by international standards, regardless of whether it is 
measured in per capita terms or as a share of GDP (McKinsey Global Institute, 2009). In 2008, per 
capita consumption was only $758 (in real 2000 terms), much lower than that of many other 
developing countries, including in Asia. 
However, a low and declining share of private consumption in aggregate demand is a characteristic 
frequently observed in rapidly industrializing economies during their early phase of economic take-
off. The industrialization experiences of Japan and the Republic of Korea indicate that the share of 
private consumption in GDP tends to fall during about the first 20 years after economic take-off, 
before turning to a slow upward trend thereafter, and that this may happen in spite of stable positive 
rates of growth in private consumption expenditure (figure 3). The reason for this is the key 
 
                                                 
8 Carroll and Slacalek (2009) use a different simulation model but arrive at similar conclusions. They also note 
that retail sales have declined particularly sharply, and considerably more than in any previous recession since 
the Second World War. 
Figure 2 
HOUSEHOLD LIABILITIES, DISPOSABLE PERSONAL 
INCOME AND LABOUR COMPENSATION IN  












1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009
Household liabilities as a share of disposable
personal income
Disposable personal income as a share of GDP
Labour compensation as a share of GDP
Trend of household liabilities as a share 
of disposable personal income, 1975–2000
Source: Author’s calculations, based on the United States 
Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds database (tables 
B100, F6 and F7). 
Note:  Data for 2009 are preliminary.   6 
importance of capital accumulation for rapid industrialization and the associated high – and initially 
rising – share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP during economic take-off (figure 4).
9 However, 
contrary to the experiences in Japan and the Republic of Korea at similar stages of economic take-off, 
China experienced a sharp decline in private consumption and a sharp increase in investment – both 
measured as a share of GDP – since about the mid-2000s, which is about 25 years after the country 




HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION IN CHINA, JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
FROM START OF ECONOMIC TAKE-OFF 
(Index numbers on a logarithmic scale, 
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics database; World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, and Global Development Finance database; and Japan, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), 
Annual Report on National Accounts of 2010, Part 1.1.  




                                                 
9 The dates used here for the beginning of economic take-off were determined through a breakpoint analysis of 
productivity growth series, measured by growth rates of GDP per worker, as is frequently used in the literature 
on catching-up and integration (Maury and Pluyaud, 2004; IMF, 2004). This analysis revealed clear starting 
breakpoints for Japan, the Republic of Korea and China. By contrast, the starting point could not be determined 
as clearly for India and, for the purpose of this analysis, was taken as 1980. These dates closely correspond to 
(but do not coincide with) the dates used by the IMF (2005) for growth take-off. However, the IMF-study 
determines the beginning of economic take-off by the start of an economy’s rapid integration into international 
trade; it is defined by the IMF (2004) as “starting when the three-year moving average of constant-price export 
growth first exceeded 10 per cent”.   7
Figure 4 
SHARE OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION IN GDP IN CHINA, JAPAN AND  
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Source:  See figure 3. 
Note:  See figure 3. 
 
 
In order to explain the two features observed since the mid-2000s with regard to China’s private 
consumption expenditure – its relatively slow growth over the five-year period as a whole, and its 
declining share in GDP – some observers have focused on the savings behaviour of households. It is 
argued that households’ marginal propensity to save has been high, and has increased further over the 
past decade because of demographic developments (such as the increase in the proportion of the 
working age population in total population), reforms of State-owned enterprises since the mid-1990s 
(which increased many households’ uncertainty as to their future pension, health and education 
expenditures) and the limited provision of health care, education and pensions by the Government 
(see, for example, Modigliani and Cao, 2004; and Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006).  
These factors are undoubtedly important explanations for the increase in the savings rate of Chinese 
households (see, e.g., McKinsey Global Institute, 2009). But it is far less likely that they played a 
major role in the decline of the share of consumption in aggregate demand. Calculations based on 
regression analysis suggest that the 5 percentage point increase in China’s household savings since the 
early 1990s has been responsible for only one-ninth of the 9 percentage point decline in the share of 
consumption in GDP that has occurred since then. The same calculations suggest that it is the decline 
in the share of households’ disposable income in GDP that is largely responsible for the relative 
decline in consumer demand (Aziz and Cui, 2007). 
The share of labour income in national income reached a peak in the mid-1990s and has been 
consistently declining since then.
10 This decline has been closely mirrored by the decline in the share 
of household consumption in GDP. At the same time, the share of corporate profits in national income 
has been increasing (figure 5). To be sure, this evidence does not suggest that labour compensation in 
 
                                                 
10 For a detailed discussion of the data issues involved in these calculations, see also Aziz and Cui, 2007.   8 
China has been falling, but only that household income and employee compensation have been 




HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION, EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, CORPORATE PROFITS 
AND DISPOSABLE INCOMES OF HOUSEHOLDS AND FIRMS IN CHINA, 1993–2007 
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Source:  Author’s calculations, based on National Bureau of Statistics of China database; and Bai and Qian, 2009a: table 4. 
 
 
At first glance, this evidence would suggest that the low and declining share of household 
consumption in GDP reflects an imbalance between employee compensation and corporate profits 
(Hung, 2009). However, this evidence is likely to be the result of a greater number of potentially 
overlapping factors whose relative quantitative importance is difficult to disentangle. 
 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that analyses of wage trends in China face “the lack of systematic, consistent aggregate data 
that cover wages and labour compensation over a wide basis and an extended period of time” (Yang, Chen and 
Monarch, 2009: 5). This is probably why headlines about double-digit growth rates of wages in China 
(e.g., JPMorgan, 2010; EIU, 2010: 27) frequently cause confusion: they refer to the 13 per cent growth between 
1998 and 2007 or to the 12 per cent rate of growth in real wages between 2003 and 2009 calculated on the basis 
of data for urban wages and salaries. The problem with these data is not only that they exclude non-urban 
manufacturing activities (such as in township and village enterprise (TVEs)), where wages are much lower, but 
also that they mainly cover the urban workforce in State-owned enterprises, where wages tend to be higher than 
in the private sector (Yang, Chen and Monarch, 2009: 9). Perhaps the most detailed study on labour cost 
developments in China (Lett and Banister, 2009: 36), which takes into account both manufacturing urban units 
and manufacturing TVEs, found that, between 2002 and 2006, employee compensation (including wages, social 
welfare contributions, housing and other benefits) in urban manufacturing units grew by an average annual rate 
of 12 per cent and in TVEs by 7 per cent; with two-thirds of manufacturing employees categorized as TVE 
workers, “total manufacturing compensation in China more closely reflects the compensation costs of TVE 
workers than it does urban unit compensation costs.” Another study provides supportive evidence: it also 
indicates an average annual rate of real wage growth in urban manufacturing of about 11.4 per cent between 
2002 and 2006, which significantly exceeds the increase of about 4.7 per cent for rural migrants during the 
period 2003–2006 (Park, Cai and Du, 2010).    9
While statistical issues
12 were key elements behind the one-off drop in the share of labour 
compensation in GDP between 2003 and 2004, structural change has probably been a key determinant 
of the tendency of this share to decline since the mid-1990s. A recent study decomposes the change in 
the aggregate share of labour compensation in GDP into changes stemming from shifts in aggregate 
output structure and those caused by differences in sectoral employment shares (Bai and Qian, 2009b). 
On the basis of this analysis, the authors argue that the main cause of the falling share of household 
disposable income and labour compensation in GDP since the mid-1990s has been the declining 
importance in total value added of agriculture and the growing importance of industry and services, 
with the employment share being much larger in the former than in the latter sectors. They also show 
that the lower share of employment in the industrial sector itself has been an amplifying factor since 
the mid-1990s. But other factors have probably also contributed. During the late 1990s and early 
2000s, a sizeable part of the decline in the wage share in industry was most likely due to the reform of 
State-owned enterprises. Moreover, for the entire 15-year period, the exceptionally high investment 
rate, the substantial inflows of foreign direct investment and the resulting capital-intensive structure of 
industrial production, combined with rapid technological progress and very high rates of labour 
productivity in Chinese manufacturing, must have contributed significantly to the relatively slow pace 
of employment growth in manufacturing, and hence in total labour compensation.
13 
A further factor that might have slowed down the growth rate of total employee compensation was the 
continued abundant supply of very-low-cost workers – a factor that is often assumed to be a defining 
characteristic of the Chinese economy. One way of estimating developments regarding surplus labour 
is by looking at the age structure of a country’s labour force.
14 While the size of China’s total labour 
force (i.e. the population aged 15 years and older), is likely to peak only in the mid-2030s, its pre-
retirement labour force (the population aged between 15 and 64 years), can be expected to peak at 
around 2015 (figure 6A). Perhaps more importantly, the size of the population entering the labour 
force defined broadly (i.e. the 15–24 year age group) reached its peak of 224 million people in 2009, 
and that of the population entering the labour force defined narrowly (i.e. the 15–19 year age group) 
reached its peak of 125 million people in 2005 (figure 6B). Taken together this evidence is indicative 
of an ageing labour force in China, which tends to be less mobile. Consequently, employers will need 
 
                                                 
12 According to international practice (such as followed in the United Nations System of National Accounts) the 
proceeds from self-employed work are treated as operating surplus (i.e. capital income), unless the self-
employed receive wages from their own enterprises or unless individuals create their own enterprises. Given the 
difficulty in distinguishing between capital income and labour income in the proceeds from self-employed work, 
China’s National Statistics used to categorize both as labour income (Aziz and Cui, 2007). One rationale for this 
might have been that in poor countries the self-employed tend almost entirely to provide labour services. This 
changed in 2003–2004: since 2004, the income of self-employed individuals engaged in non-agricultural 
activities has been counted as capital income (Bai and Qian, 2009a). As a result, more than half of the steep 
decline in the share of employee compensation (the thick line shown in figure 5) for 2004 was most probably due 
to this change in statistical reporting (Bai and Qian, 2009b). 
13 According to standard economic theory, a high and increasing rate of investment and a growing capital 
intensity of production reduce the return on capital. As a result, the total income accruing to capital would 
decline and that accruing to labour would increase. This is the opposite of what happened in China. A possible 
explanation is that rapid technological progress accompanied the intensive use of capital and prevented 
additional investment from becoming less efficient. 
14 One complementary measure relates to the unemployment trend. However, data available for China provide 
conflicting evidence of this trend: while data from the 2000 census and from the 2005 mini census point to a 
decline in unemployment, from 8.1 per cent to 5.2 per cent over this period of time, labour force survey data for 
the same period suggest that in 2002 there was a reversal of the initial decline in unemployment, but that, 
nonetheless, unemployment declined from 7.6 per cent in 2000 to 7 per cent in 2005 (Park, Cai and Du, 2010). 
Another complementary measure relates to surveys of wage rates. According to Zhang, Yang and Wang (2010), 
primary surveys of wage rates provide more reliable statistics than employment data and indicate an acceleration 
of the trend increase in real wages that had begun in 2003.   10 
to pay a higher wage premium to get and retain workers,
15 so that real wages are likely to grow more 
rapidly relative to productivity than in the past. Indeed, according to media reports, minimum wages 
have been rising strongly in several provinces (Mitchell and Dyer, 2010). While this evidence suggests 
a broad tendency towards rising wages, it must be interpreted with caution. Part of it could be a 
reaction to more supportive agricultural policies, such as the abolition of the agricultural tax (Knight, 
2007). But in any case, although not for demographic reasons, this would have increased the premium 
for employers to induce workers to migrate from rural to urban areas. All of these factors combined 
could be a powerful stimulus to domestic consumption. 
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Source:  Author’s calculations, based on the United States Census Bureau database. 
Note:  Data from 2010 are estimates. 
 
 
Taken together, this evidence indicates that Chinese households’ disposable income, and hence their 
consumption spending, is likely to increase in the near future due to demographic developments that 
will exert upward pressure on wages. This tendency could be reinforced through policy measures. 
Financial sector reform and government transfer payments could increase the non-wage elements of 
household incomes, while an increase in government spending on social security (including pensions, 
health and education) and public investment in housing could help reduce household precautionary 
savings. 
 
                                                 
15 This evidence does not mean that China’s total labour supply is shrinking and that the country will be facing a 
labour shortage any time soon. On the other hand, the radically altered age structure of the labour force means 
that wages are almost certain to rise faster relative to productivity growth than they have over the past 20 years.   11
III. THE TRADE IMPACT OF CONSUMPTION SPENDING  
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
Buoyant consumer demand in the United States was the main driver of global economic growth for 
many years in the run-up to the current global economic crisis. A return of United States household 
savings to about 4 per cent of disposable income – the average of the mid-1990s (i.e. before those 
households went on a spending spree) – would translate into a fall in household consumption of about 
3 per cent of United States GDP. Given that before the crisis United States household consumption 
accounted for about 16 per cent of global demand and that a sizeable part of United States 
consumption consists of imports, this would imply both a reduction in world demand and a decline in 
other countries’ export opportunities. From 2000 to 2007, United States imports grew from an amount 
equal to 15 per cent of United States GDP to 17 per cent, boosting aggregate demand in the rest of the 
world by $937 billion, in nominal terms. Moreover, given global production sharing, United States 
consumer spending boosts global economic activities also in many indirect ways, e.g. business 
investment in countries such as Germany and Japan to produce machinery for export to China and its 
use there for the manufacture of exports to the United States. In short, the future path of United States 
consumption spending has macroeconomic implications not only for economic recovery in the United 
States but also for global growth.
16 
The question arises as to which countries’ consumer demand could make up for the decline in United 
States consumer demand. This raises at least three issues: (i) the importance of the absolute level of 
United States household consumption at the global level; (ii) the composition of United States imports 
of consumer goods; and (iii) the import content of United States household consumption. The first two 
of these issues are discussed in the remainder of this section, while the latter one is addressed in the 
following section. 
Regarding the first question, United States consumer demand is by far the largest in the world in 
absolute terms (figure 7). It should be noted that figure 7 gives a somewhat biased impression because 
the underlying data relate to the period when highly leveraged, unsustainable debt-financed consumer 
spending played a sizeable role in the United States. This is in strong contrast to China where 
household debt to GDP is roughly 20 per cent (i.e. relatively low because, for example, the vast 
majority of cars is sold for cash), compared to about 100 per cent in the United States (Lardy, 
2009: 6). This means that in the United States consumer demand is likely to shrink, not just grow 
slower, while in China it is likely to grow rapidly. Hence, the contribution of China to global 
consumption in the future is likely to be significantly larger than extrapolations of the data represented 
in the graph may indicate. 
What would be the impact of a reduction in United States consumer demand on the country’s current-
account balance? The deterioration in the United States current account balance up to 2006 and its 
recent improvement have been largely driven by changes in the trade account.
17 Indeed, merchandise 
trade is by far the most important component of the United States current account. With a deficit of 
about $800 billion, which corresponds to 6 per cent of GDP, the trade deficit has been responsible for 
an average of about 110 per cent of the current-account deficit in the past five years.
18 
 
                                                 
16 The adverse demand effect on the rest of the world would also occur if household consumption was replaced 
by government consumption. This is because much of government consumption relates to public sector service 
activities which have a low import content. 
17 The current account is the sum of the trade balance, the balance on labour income, the balance on international 
investment income and unilateral transfers (foreign aid and remittances). 
18 While the balance on unilateral current transfers is slightly negative, the balance on income and on trade in 
services is positive, so that the trade deficit exceeds the size of the current-account deficit as a whole (numbers in 
text calculated from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Aggregate Income and International Transactions 
databases).   12 
 
 
However, these aggregate data mask important features that are of particular importance for the link 
between household consumption and current-account imbalances. While capital goods and industrial 
supplies and materials (excluding energy) are the largest categories on both sides of the United States 
trade account, a disaggregation of the United States trade deficit by main end-use categories shows 
that consumer goods, including automotive products, accounted for over 85 per cent of the increase in 
the non-energy trade deficit between 1997 and 2008 (figure 8). A loss in competitiveness may partly 
explain the worsening balance of trade in consumer goods. But the rapidly expanding household 
consumption has most likely been the major cause of the large and widening deficit in the 
consumption categories of United States trade, and thus in its current account. 
 
Figure 7 
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES AND COUNTRY GROUPS,  
AVERAGE FOR 2007–2008 

















Source:  Author’s calculations, based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics database. 
a  Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Emirates.   13
Figure 8 
CURRENT-ACCOUNT BALANCE AND TRADE BALANCE  
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Source:  Author’s calculations, based on the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis database. 
Note:  nes = not elsewhere specified.  
 
 
It is unlikely that the sharp decline in United States imports of consumer goods could be compensated 
by an increase in consumer spending and associated imports of consumer goods by China or any other 
developing country. Given that China’s consumption was only about one eighth of United States 
consumption and that its GDP at current exchange rates is only one third that of the United States, 
there is little reason to believe that household consumption in China could supplant United States 
household consumption as a driver of global growth any time soon.
19 In order for Chinese 
consumption to compensate for the decline of United States consumption back towards its average 
long-term trend, the share of consumer spending in GDP in China would need to increase by about 
10–15 percentage points (depending on the difference in the two countries’ rate of GDP-growth) – an 
unlikely occurrence in the foreseeable future.
20 Domestic demand could also expand in other relatively 
large and rapidly growing developing countries, notably Brazil and India. However, compared to the 
United States economy, the economies of these countries are still small, making it unlikely that they 
could compensate fully for the decline in United States consumption. Rather, household consumption 
in developed countries in the European Union, particularly Germany, as well as Japan, would be better 
placed to achieve this. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the composition of United States imports of consumer goods differs 
greatly from that in many other countries. An import similarity index based on 428 different consumer 
goods indicates that China’s basket of imported consumer goods overlaps that of the United States by 
 
                                                 
19 What is more, the import content of domestic consumption in China is significantly smaller than in the United 
States (see section 4 below). 
20 According to the Bank for International Settlements (2007: 56) “final consumption goods constitute only 4 per 
cent of China’s total imports and calculations suggest that the elasticity of demand for its ordinary imports 
(i.e. those not used for processing in the export sector) with respect to domestic spending is insignificant.”   14 
only about 45 per cent (figure 9).
21 This index also indicates that the composition of imports of 
consumer goods by major developed countries with current-account surpluses, namely Germany and 
Japan, is very similar to that of the United States. Combined with the evidence on the size of 
household consumption shown in figure 7, this shows that these two developed countries would be in 
a better position than China to compensate for the decline in United States consumer goods imports. 
 
Figure 9 
PERCENTAGE OF SIMILARITY IN THE COMPOSITION OF CONSUMER GOOD IMPORTS OF SELECTED 





















Source:  Author’s calculations, based on United Nations, UN COMTRADE database. 
 
 
                                                 
21 For this analysis, consumer goods are identified on the basis of the United Nations Classification by Broad 
Economic Categories (BEC), codes 61, 62 and 63, which cover durable, semi-durable and non-durable consumer 
goods, respectively (United Nations, 1971). Using concordance tables, these codes were translated into 428 
products at the 5-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification, Revision 3. The import similarity 
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share of good i in the imports of country j.   15
IV. THE ACCUMULATION OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES: INCOME, TRADE  
AND EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The previous sections addressed issues in relation to consumption spending in China and the United 
States. However, it is clear that developments in consumption spending in these two countries affect 
the global economy as a whole. One reason for this is the large size of these two economies. More 
important in the current context is the continued large difference in their levels of per capita income 
combined with the fact that the level and structure of world trade is influenced by the relative 
importance of rich and poor countries in global economic growth.
22 As long as per capita income 
growth in rich countries drive the rate of global economic growth, their demand pattern will have a 
key effect for global trade patterns: given their already high levels of industrialization and per capita 
income, their demand preferences will, in addition to often non-tradeable services, tend to emphasize 
manufactured consumer goods, rather than industrial raw materials, energy and food products that will 
feature more prominently in the demand patterns of rapidly industrializing poorer countries. But if 
rapidly industrializing developing countries assume an increasingly more important role in global 
demand growth, their demand pattern, and its relatively greater emphasis on industrial raw materials, 
energy and food products, will play a greater role in global demand growth.  
Whether per capita income growth is driven by investment, consumption or exports will also affect 
global trade flows. There are sizeable differences in the import intensity of different components of 
demand. Numerical evidence from developed countries indicates that import intensities vary over time 
and that, in most countries, the import intensity of exports exceeds that in consumption which, in turn, 
exceeds that in investment (see, e.g., Kranendonk and Verbruggen, 2008). The large import intensity 
of exports is due to the internationalisation of production through global value chains. The import 
intensity of household consumption is relatively low because of the importance of non-tradeable 
services in consumer spending. The level of the import intensity of investment very much depends on 
the maturity of the domestic capital-goods industry, as well as on the importance of foreign-direct 
investment in gross capital formation. Though there is no readily available numerical evidence, the 
import intensity of private consumption most likely exceeds that of government consumption, since 
public servant wages are an important part of the latter. Similarly, the import intensity of private 
investment is likely to exceed that of public investment, since the latter includes a lot of services. 
While these differences in the relative importance of import intensities across different elements of 
aggregate demand are likely to apply in most countries, there are important differences across 
countries for specific elements. Evidence for developed countries indicates that the import intensity of 
consumption in the United States is significantly lower than that in countries of the Euro-area, and that 
the import intensity of United States exports is also very low. For the period 2003–2007, the import 
intensity of United States consumption was only slightly more than half that of Germany, while the 
import intensity of United States exports was less than one third of that of Germany (see, e.g., 
Kranendonk and Verbruggen, 2008). Assuming a given level of total aggregate demand, this implies 
that demand rebalancing from exports to consumption in Germany combined with demand rebalancing 
from consumption to exports in the United States would cause a decline in the imports of these two 
countries combined. 
Similar numerical evidence is not available for developing countries. However, estimates indicate that 
the import intensity of China’s consumption is only about 8 per cent, i.e. about half that in the United 
States (Akyüz, 2010). The same study estimates that the import intensity of China’s exports is 
significantly higher than that of developed countries, but that it is even higher in the other developing 
 
                                                 
22 Differences in comparative advantage among developed countries, as well as among developing countries, 
play of course also a role for the composition of global demand. As far as developed countries are concerned, 
rapid economic growth in, for example, Japan will imply global imports of industrial raw materials, energy and 
food products to grow more rapidly than similar growth rates in countries with a richer natural-resource 
endowment, such as the United States.   16 
countries participating in the East and South-East Asian production networks, such as Malaysia and 
Thailand. 
Differences in the import intensity of different elements of aggregate demand imply that changes in 
the composition of a country’s aggregate demand will cause significant shifts in its imports. They also 
imply that these changes in imports occur even if the level of national aggregate demand itself does 
not change. On the other hand, these changes are reinforced by differences in the growth rates of the 
different components in global aggregate demand. For example, in the lead-up to the current crisis, 
global output growth was characterized by a relatively high import intensity, based on the combination 
of three factors: (i) rapid growth in the United States based on consumption, rather than exports; (ii) 
the export-oriented development strategy that many countries in East and South-East Asia have been 
following over the past two or three decades, which was embedded in global production sharing and 
an associated high import content of these countries’ exports; and (iii) the ensuing rapid 
industrialization in Asian developing economies, especially China, which was one of the factors that 
supported rapidly growing demand and booming prices for primary commodities between 2002 and 
2008. The resulting boost to the exports of commodity-exporting countries is reflected in the fact that, 
over the period 2002–2008, world exports of agricultural products and especially of mineral and fuels 
grew more rapidly than total world exports of goods and services (figure 10). These developments 
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Source:  Author’s calculations, based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics database. 
 
 
These level and compositional effects of global demand have price implications. For example, a 
tendency towards a greater importance of manufactured consumer goods in global demand, driven by 
rapid growth in industrialized economies, may result in a downward shift in the terms of trade for 
primary-commodity exporters, while a tendency towards a greater importance of industrial raw 
materials, energy and food products, driven by rapid growth in relatively less-industrialized countries, 
may reverse this downward shift, at least temporarily. These price effects will, in turn, guide 
investment decisions and lead to changes in the sectoral focus of investment, productivity, output and 
employment growth.    17
The remainder of this section examines which sectors have driven per capita output growth and 
employment generation in developing and transition economies during the period prior to the current 
crisis. Four economic sectors are identified: agriculture (which also includes hunting, forestry and 
fishing), mining (which also includes utilities), manufacturing and services.
23 Two sub-periods are 
distinguished: (i) from 1995 to 2002, when developed countries, notably the United States, were the 
dominant drivers of global demand, while several emerging-market economies experienced slow 
growth; and (ii) between 2002 and 2008, when economic growth accelerated in a number of emerging-
market economies, in particular the large and populated “BRIC” countries (i.e. Brazil, the Russian 
Federation, India and China) that joined the United States as major drivers of global demand, which 
boosted the demand for primary commodities. The distinction of these two sub-periods forms the 
background for projections, in the following section, with regard to an emerging situation in which the 
importance for global growth of United States consumer demand will tend to decline sharply, while 
the role of the BRIC countries for global growth and global demand patterns is likely to remain 
growing. 
In the vast majority of developing and transition economies that have experienced rapid per capita 
output growth, this has been associated with above-average growth of output in manufactures and/or 
services (figure 11), particularly in China and India. In countries where aggregate growth rates have 
been negative or low, so have been the growth rates of manufactured output. During the first sub-
period, in most regions per capita output growth was slow, without a clear sectoral pattern. 
When overall output growth accelerated after 2002, growth rates in the manufacturing and services 
sectors exceeded those in agricultural and mining sectors – a somewhat surprising development in a 
context of rapidly rising primary commodity prices in global markets. Several factors could explain 
this feature. First, it could indicate that policymakers managed well the inflow of windfall profits 
resulting from the commodity price boom. Using these revenues for diversifying their economies such 
that supplementary income obtained from primary activities could generate demand for the entire 
domestic economy, policymakers may have avoided the adverse impact on non-resource sectors that 
previously had often been associated with natural-resource booms. 
A, second, complementary explanation may be that rapidly expanding household consumption in the 
United States provided sufficiently high external demand for many developing countries such that, on 
aggregate, developing and transition economies enjoyed buoyant external demand across all four 
economic sectors.
24 This could further explain, for example, the increase in the growth rates of 
manufactured output between the first and the second sub-period in those countries that export 
manufactures to the United States either directly (such as South America, Central America and the 
Caribbean, as well as South Asia excluding India), or more indirectly as part of the vertically 
integrated production chain that spans across South-East and East Asia and whose hub in most 
instances is China (figure 11). To the extent that this is the case, a decline in United States household 
consumption, and the potentially associated decline in United States imports of manufactured goods, is 
likely to have serious adverse implications for the manufacturing sectors in a wide range of developing 
countries. This issue is addressed in more detail in the following section. 
 
 
                                                 
23 Construction is not included in this analysis because developments in the real estate sector are often affected 
by financial factors unrelated to productivity and employment, which would blur the analysis. 
24 Rapid growth of the services sector was probably also due to strong expansion of retailing and other 
consumption related services and, thus, more a reaction than a cause of the rapid expansion of aggregate output.   18 
Figure 11 
PER CAPITA OUTPUT BY SECTOR, SELECTED COUNTRIES AND COUNTRY GROUPS, 1995–2008 
(Average annual growth rates) 
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics database; and UNECE, Economic Statistics 
database for the Russian Federation in 2002. 
Note:  South-East Asia excludes Singapore. West Asia comprises: Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates. North Africa excludes Sudan. First-tier newly industrializing economies (NIEs) are: Hong Kong (China), the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. For China, mining is included in manufacturing due to 
the lack of disaggregated output data for mining. 
 
While figure 11 indicate percentages changes over the past 15 years, the absolute number of jobs that 
these four sectors have provided depends on their relative weight in each economy. Agriculture 
accounts for a significant share of total employment in several regions, particularly in Asia, North 
Africa and the CIS countries, a share that is much larger than its relative contribution to total value 
added (figure 12).
25 This contrasts with manufacturing, where the contribution to total GDP is 
generally higher than that to total employment, showing that labour productivity in manufacturing is 
above the average for these economies. With regard to the mining sector, it appears that whatever it 
may contribute to GDP, its direct contribution to employment is marginal. The services sector 
 
                                                 
25 Due to data limitations, sub-Saharan Africa is not included in figure 12.   19
accounts for the largest share of employment in many regions, with labour productivity close to the 
economies’ average labour productivity. Taken together, this evidence indicates that the employment 
impact of global rebalancing will most likely be closely related to the sectoral effects that rebalancing 
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Source:  See figure 11. 
Note:  For mining in China see note to figure 11.  
  BRA: Brazil; CHN: China; IND: India; MEX: Mexico; KOR: Republic of Korea; RUS: Russian Federation; SEA (South-
East Asia): Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand; SA (South Asia): Pakistan and Sri Lanka; WA (West 
Asia): Qatar and Saudi Arabia; SAm (South America): Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru; NA (North Africa): Egypt and Morocco; CE (Central Europe): Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland; CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States): Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Time periods vary: 1995–2007: China, Republic of Korea, South Asia and North Africa; 1995–2006: India; 1998–2007: 
CIS.   20 
V. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF A GLOBAL REBALANCING ON TRADE FLOWS  
AND EMPLOYMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
This section focuses on the implications of global rebalancing for trade flows and employment. These 
implications are inferred from a simulation of the impact of reduced consumer spending in the United 
States and increased consumer spending in China (both measured as a share in GDP) on changes in 
sectoral trade flows and employment. Annex 1 to this paper provides details on how this simulation 
was carried out, and presents some additional results. The results from the simulation may be 
considered as reflecting the medium-term effects (i.e. spanning a period of 5–10 years) of rebalancing 
confined to China and the United States. However, it should be borne in mind that the results of the 
simulation are only partial; they are not intended to describe the overall impact of a global 
rebalancing. In addition, they should be interpreted with considerable caution since they do not take 
into account a number of factors, such as difficulties in moving labour across sectors, subsidies and 
problems of market access. Nevertheless, simulations are useful for identifying the countries and 
sectors that are vulnerable to global rebalancing and for forming an idea of the order of magnitudes 
involved. 
The simulation is based on the assumptions that adjustment in the United States would lead to a 
slowdown in the rate of GDP growth there,
26 and that in both China and the United States the share of 
household consumption in GDP would be restored to historic levels. Taking account of differences in 
the size of GDP in China and the United States, the latter assumption implies that the increase in 
China’s consumption would compensate about half of the decline in United States consumption. To 
anticipate the main result: the simulation indicates that this would remove much of the demand 
stimulus, which, prior to the outbreak of the current crisis, the United States was providing to the 
world economy, and that this would not be compensated by a stimulus of similar size from increased 
consumption in China.  
The results of the simulation are presented in terms of changes relative to 2008. With respect to global 
imbalances as a whole, the results indicate that the assumed adjustments in China and the United 
States would cause substantial changes in these two countries’ trade accounts: for China, the trade 
surplus as a share of GDP would decline by more than eight percentage points, so that only a fairly 
small surplus position would remain, while for the United States, the trade balance as a share of GDP 
would improve by more than five percentage points and move the trade account into a slight surplus 
(columns 2 and 3 in table 1). However, important trade imbalances would persist in other countries: 
for example, trade surpluses would decline only a little in Germany and in the countries in the group 
comprising West Asia and North Africa. In spite of sizeable reductions, the trade surplus would also 
remain high in a number of developing countries in East and South-East Asia, such as Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and the countries comprising the group of other countries in East and South-
East Asia. These results are likely to be due to the fact, discussed in the two preceding sections, that 
the absolute value of China’s household consumer spending is much smaller than that of United States 
households, its import content is smaller, and the composition of China’s imports of consumer goods 
differs greatly from that of the United States. The net effect of the two adjustments taken together 
would be deflationary for the world economy, while they would not be sufficient to unwind the global 
imbalances. 
 
                                                 
26 This assumption is consistent with the simulations by the United Nations (2010) which indicate that the ratio 
of the United States current-account deficit to GDP would increase, rather than shrink, over the coming five 
years if the United States economy were to grow at a rate similar to that prior to the current crisis. It is also in 
line with earlier experiences of rebalancing in countries with an external deficit that is typically associated with a 
slowdown in output growth, as noted by the IMF (2010). A main finding of this latter study is that policy-
induced reversals of external surpluses are not typically associated with lower growth, which is in line with the 
assumptions made here with regard to China. However, to the extent that exporting allows for dynamic external 
benefits (e.g., through learning-by-doing effects) that are not present in output production for the domestic 
market, rebalancing from exports to domestic consumer demand may imply a slowdown in output growth.   21
Table 1 
GTAP SIMULATION RESULTS OF THE IMPACT OF REBALANCING IN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 
ON TRADE FLOWS AND FACTOR PRICES, SELECTED COUNTRIES AND COUNTRY GROUPS 






























age points)   (Per  cent) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
China  -8.2  1.8  -17.6  3.7  2.9  7.1  6.6  8.8 
United States  5.2  0.6  41.9  -15.4  -7.2  -8.2  -8.1  -8.5 
China, Hong Kong SAR  -1.4  14.9  -1.2  0.6  -0.1  2.3  2.3  2.2 
China, Taiwan Province of  -1.0  14.3  -0.6  1.4  0.3  2.1  2.1  2.0 
Indonesia  -1.1  0.8  -2.8 1.0 0.3 2.7  2.7 2.7 
Malaysia  -1.6  42.4  -0.5 1.3 0.3 2.3  2.1 1.9 
Philippines  -1.3  3.6  -1.4 0.8  -0.1 2.1  2.1 2.0 
Republic  of  Korea  -1.6  1.5  -3.4 1.5 0.8 2.9  3.1 2.9 
Singapore  -1.7  -2.6  -0.3 1.3 0.5 2.7  2.7 2.7 
Thailand  -3.7  5.8  -3.7 1.9 0.4 2.9  2.9 2.9 
Rest of East and South East 
Asia  -1.6  2.0  -2.2 0.1  -0.1 2.1  2.0 1.7 
India  -1.2  -7.7  -6.6 2.7 1.1 3.6  3.8 3.8 
South Asia, excl. India  -1.2  -17.1  -6.7  1.7  0.8  3.3  3.2  3.3 
West Asia and North Africa  -1.5  13.8  -1.7  2.6  0.7  2.8  2.9  2.6 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -1.7  1.2  -2.5 3.1 0.7 3.1  3.2 3.3 
Argentina  and  Brazil  -1.8  0.8  -7.7 5.2 2.1 4.1  4.0 4.1 
Mexico  -2.1  -2.1  -6.0 4.9 3.3 3.2  3.3 3.4 
Rest of developing America  -1.6  -1.8  -3.8  3.4  1.5  2.7  2.8  2.9 
Canada  -1.7  -2.7  -2.9 5.7 3.1 2.3  2.4 2.4 
Germany  -1.9  3.8  -3.8 2.3 0.6 3.2  3.1 3.1 
Rest of EU-25 and EFTA
d  -1.6  -3.5  -3.6 2.0 0.7 3.2  3.2 3.2 
Australia  and  New  Zealand -1.5  -1.8  -5.5 3.8 1.5 3.6  3.7 3.6 
Japan  -2.0  -1.0  -12.7 5.7 2.3 4.3  4.3 4.4 
CIS, excl. the Republic of 
Moldova  -0.8  6.6  -1.2 1.4 0.4 2.9  3.0 2.8 
Rest  of  the  world  -1.8  -9.6  -2.3 1.7 0.3 2.9  2.9 2.6 
Source: Author’s  calculations. 
Note:  All changes are relative to 2008. 
a  An improvement in the terms of trade indicates that the price of exports increased more (or fell less) than the price 
for imports.  
b  An appreciation indicates an increase in the price for primary factors, which may be likened to an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate.  
c  The definition of skilled and unskilled labour and the wage ratio between skilled and unskilled labour is explained in 
footnote 36. 
d  EFTA - European Free Trade Association.   22 
Looking at developments in exports and imports separately (columns 4 and 5 in table 1), the results 
indicate that for the United States a sharp decline in imports would be accompanied by an even 
sharper increase in exports. Apart from China, whose trade balance would deteriorate mainly because 
of its own adjustment efforts, the greatest decline would occur for Thailand, followed by Mexico, 
Japan (which would experience the strongest percentage decline in exports), Germany and Singapore. 
In most countries, particularly developing countries in Asia (notably China, India and Thailand), the 
deterioration in the trade balance would be caused mainly by a decline in exports rather than by an 
increase in imports, as indicated by the difference in the growth rates reported in columns four and 
five of the table. The strong increase in United States exports (a large proportion of which consist of 
machinery and electronic equipment, as well as services) and the strong decline in its imports would 
be facilitated by the sharp depreciation of the dollar (column 7 in table 1).
27 Additional results (not 
shown here) indicate that the bulk of the increase in United States exports would be directed to 
developed countries, namely Japan and members of the European Union, while the bulk of the decline 
in United States imports would particularly affect the members of the European Union, as well as 
China and Japan. 
Turning to changes in the sectoral structure of trade, the percentage changes in the trade balance of the 
United States would be largest for machinery and equipment and electronic equipment (table 2). This 
improvement would be mirrored by a sizeable deterioration in the trade balance for these sectors in all 
Asian economies included in the table, as well as Mexico and Germany. The strong improvement in 
the United States trade balance for chemicals (which includes pharmaceuticals – the single most 
important item in United States consumer goods imports) would be mirrored by a substantial 
deterioration in the trade balance for these products in Germany and Singapore. The strong 
improvement in the United States trade balance for motor vehicles and other transport equipment 
would be mirrored by a sizeable deterioration in the trade balance for these products in Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore (though most of these effects 
for Singapore are likely to be due to trans-shipment, as witnessed by the strong deterioration in 
Singapore’s trade balance for commercial services and trade and transport). 
To determine how the changes in sectoral trade balances would affect employment, it is useful to 
relate these changes to sectoral differences in labour intensity.
28 Concentrating on the changes in world 
exports of industrial products (shown in the last column of table 2) suggests that the simulated 
adjustments in the economies of China and the United States would lead to sizeable adverse 
employment impacts in the world economy as a whole. This is indicated by the fact that world exports 
 
                                                 
27 The set-up of the GTAP-model implies that external imbalances caused by an exogenous shock are removed 
and the external balance is restored by changes in the prices of primary factors, downwards to spur exports and 
reduce imports, or upwards to reduce exports and increase imports. The relationship between the price of 
primary factors across different countries may be likened to an exchange rate. Real and nominal exchange-rate 
changes coincide because GTAP, as most other computable general equilibrium models, deals with real 
variables, with no money involved. 
28 This analysis is based on the methodology proposed by Rajan and Subramanian (2006), who measure the 
labour intensity of a sector by the unweighted average across countries of the share of wages and salaries in 
value added for specific industrial sectors. The averages used here refer to the period 1995–2005 and cover all 
countries for which data are available in the Industrial Statistics database CD-ROM, 2009 of the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The mapping of industrial sectors at the three-digit level of the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Revision 3 into the sectors used for the GTAP-simulations 
is based on the concordance table made available on the GTAP-website (https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/ 
databases/contribute/concordinfo.asp). The data-points shown in figure 13 are unweighted averages based on a 
total of 10,210 country-sector observations, of which 5,227 refer to developed, 4,573 to developing and 410 to 
transition economies, respectively. The distribution of the data-points along the horizontal axis in figure 13 
changes only marginally if the period is limited to 2000–2005 or if averages are calculated only for developed or 
developing countries. The sample period ends in 2005 because no comprehensive data are available for more 
recent years.   23
would decline in the majority of industrial sectors (figure 13). Perhaps more importantly, the largest 




GTAP SIMULATION RESULTS FOR CHANGES IN SECTORAL TRADE BALANCE,  
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND COUNTRY GROUPS 
































































































































































































Grains and crops  -0.22  0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.02 0.00  0.06 -0.09  1.46 
Forestry and fishing  -0.02  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.03 
Mining  -0.08  0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.14 -0.08  -0.18 
Livestock and meat products  -0.13  0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01  0.34 
Processed food  -0.24  0.14 -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.16 -0.19 -0.01 0.00 -0.16 -0.05  -0.93 
Textiles  -0.51  0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.14 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.02  -1.85 
Wearing apparel  -0.40  0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.17 -0.06  -4.95 
Leather products  -0.42  0.05  -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00  -4.30 
Wood products  -0.31  0.11 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.13 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01  -3.41 
Paper products and publishing  -0.11  0.11 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02  0.09 
Petroleum and coal products  -0.02  0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07  0.00 -0.01  -0.29 
Chemicals, rubber, plastic prod.  -0.62  0.68 -0.21 -0.13 -0.34 -0.23 -0.33 -0.28 -0.22 -0.42 -0.37 -0.14  -0.72 
Mineral products, nes  -0.09  0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01  0.35 
Ferrous metals  -0.11  0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.04  0.46 
Metals, nes  -0.08  0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.01  0.02 -0.12  0.27 
Metal products  -0.33  0.12 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03  -0.52 
Motor vehicles and parts  -0.20  0.40 -0.15 -0.02 -0.18 -0.32 0.00 -0.41 -0.26 -0.04 -0.11 -0.11  -1.23 
Transport equipment, nes  -0.25  0.37 -0.20 -0.10 -0.17 -0.10 -0.24 -0.03 -0.20 -0.67 -0.15 -0.15  4.18 
Electronic equipment  -1.38  0.68 -0.13 -0.02 -0.18 -0.49 -0.77 -0.36 -0.33 -0.23 -0.72 -0.10  0.04 
Machinery and equipment, nes  -2.05  1.40 -0.45 -0.17 -0.66 -0.64 -0.54 -0.71 -0.38 -0.45 -1.10 -0.37  1.85 
Manufactures, nes  -0.58  0.20 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.22 -0.04  -3.87 
Utilities and construction  -0.02  0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02  4.27 
Trade and transport  -0.47  0.34 -0.07 -0.11 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.15 -0.32 -0.15  -0.21 
Commercial services  -0.15  0.51 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.22 -0.47 -0.19 -0.17  1.10 
Other services  -0.17  0.29 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.07 -0.16 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16  3.85 
Source: Author’s  calculations. 
Note:  Trade balance refers to volumes. Percentage shares of trade volumes and values in GDP in the base year are identical, as
prices are assumed to equal one.  
  nes = not elsewhere specified.  
a  Excluding the Republic of Moldova.  
 
                                                 
29 There are two exceptions to this: (i) the category “machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified” 
includes, for example, machinery, domestic appliances, optical instruments, watches and clocks; (ii) the category 
“transport equipment not elsewhere classified” includes railway vehicles, aircraft and associated equipment, and 
ships and boats.   24 
Figure 13 
LABOUR INTENSITY AND GTAP SIMULATION RESULTS FOR CHANGES IN WORLD EXPORTS  
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Source:  Author’s calculations, based on GTAP simulations; and UNIDO, Industrial Statistics database, CD-ROM 2009. 
Note:  Labour intensity is measured as the unweighted world average of the share of wages and salaries in sectoral value 
added during the period 1995–2005.   
  crp  =  Chemicals, rubber and plastic products  nmm =  Non-metallic mineral products 
 ele  =  Electronic  equipment  ome  =  Machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified 
  fmp  =  Metal products  omf  =  Manufactures not elsewhere classified 
 i_s  =  Ferrous  metals  otn  =  Transport equipment not elsewhere classified 
  lea   =  Leather products  p_c  =  Petroleum and coal products 
  lmt  =  Livestock and meat products  ppp  =  Paper products, publishing 
  lum  =  Wood products  prf  =  Processed food  
  mvh  =  Motor vehicles and parts  tex  =  Textiles 
  nfm  =  Metals not elsewhere classified  wap  =  Wearing apparel 
 
 
The decline in world exports of labour-intensive industrial goods will have different implications for 
different countries, depending on their sectoral production and trade structure. The simulation results 
for changes in sectoral employment suggest that in China employment would decline in most 
industrial sectors (but substantially increase in agriculture, utilities and services) (table 3). By contrast, 
in the United States, employment would increase in most industrial sectors, as well as in agriculture, 
but decline in all sectors in utilities and services. The United States is also the only country shown in 
the table (except Singapore) which would experience an increase in employment in the two labour-
intensive sectors for which the estimations indicate an increase in world exports (see figure 13): 
“machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified” and “transport equipment not elsewhere 
classified”. This contrasts with the results for most countries, especially those in Asia, for which the 
simulations indicate that adverse employment effects are likely to be concentrated in the most labour-
intensive sectors. For example, among the countries shown in table 3, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of 
Korea, and Thailand may experience a reduction (or only a very slight increase) in employment in 
labour-intensive sectors such as apparel, transport equipment, textiles, and machinery and equipment 
(which includes domestic appliances). However, these results should not be taken as quantitatively 
precise predictions. In particular, it should be noted that the evidence shown in figure 13 is limited to 
industrial sectors. Many of the countries that experience declining employment in (labour-intensive) 
industrial sectors record increasing employment in primary and services sectors, as shown in the two 
bottom panels of table 3. While data limitations do not allow making an assessment of the labour 
intensity of these sectors, the evidence shown in figure 12 above indicates that, in most countries,   25
agricultural and services activities are considerably more labour intensive than manufacturing. Thus, it 
is difficult to assess the impact of global rebalancing on total employment. In spite of these limitations 
the reported results taken together provide useful qualitative information that indicates broad 
directions of the possible employment effects of a global rebalancing resulting from adjustments only 
in China and the United States. 
 
Table 3 
GTAP SIMULATION RESULTS FOR CHANGES IN SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT,  







































































































































Industrial goods                
Petroleum and coal products  1.1  -2.7  -0.4  -0.1  -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.6  -0.8 0.7  0.5  0.5 
Processed food  4.8  -3.7  -0.9 0.0 0.2  -0.1 1.8 3.5  -0.2 0.6 -0.9 -0.2 
Livestock and meat products  7.2  -1.3 -2.1 -0.3  0.3 -1.6  0.9  0.9 -1.2  0.2  -0.4  0.3 
Metals, nes  -11.7  30.4 -6.7 -2.4 -2.7 -4.1  1.1 -1.8 -1.7  1.0  -3.0  -4.4 
Chemicals, rubber, plastic products  -7.4  14.7 -4.3 -2.8 -3.3 -4.9 -2.0  1.7 -3.0 -1.9  -3.7  -1.6 
Ferrous metals  -5.7  21.2  -4.1 0.3  -0.7  -2.8 2.6 3.6 0.1 4.7  1.0  0.3 
Non-metallic mineral products, nes  -0.6  7.8 1.2 1.0 1.8 1.6 3.0 3.0 2.3 3.8  4.1  2.2 
Paper products and publishing  -3.1  3.3 -2.8 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -0.7  1.8 -1.9 -1.2  -1.8  -0.4 
Electronic equipment  -11.4  27.2  -1.8 0.1  -0.8  -4.7 0.1  -4.1  -1.6 0.5 -2.1  1.1 
Metal products  -7.4  12.2  -2.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.5  -2.4 0.2 1.3  0.0  1.8 
Wood products  -11.7  4.9  -4.5 0.4 1.2 2.0 0.6  -6.6 0.7 1.6 -3.5  0.5 
Motor vehicles and parts  -2.3  4.1  -0.6 0.9  -0.3  -5.4 1.1 0.4  -2.1 4.0  4.0  1.5 
Manufactures, nes  -9.5  17.3 0.8  -0.5 0.6 0.3 0.0  -1.0  -0.7 3.0 -3.2 -0.5 
Machinery and equipment, nes  -10.3  21.3 -5.2 -0.2 -2.3 -5.7 -2.2 -3.0 -1.7  1.3  -4.0  -0.8 
Textiles  -8.6  13.7  -2.2 0.2 0.3  -1.7 1.5  -4.1  -1.2 3.5 -1.3 -0.2 
Leather products  -12.9  29.6 -3.8  2.9  1.4 -0.4 -3.1  5.4  1.4  2.6  1.0  2.2 
Wearing apparel  -4.4  4.2 0.1 0.5 1.0 0.7  -6.3  -3.5  -1.4  -4.7 -2.6 -1.9 
Transport equipment, nes  -7.1  22.4 -10.3  -7.7  -8.3 -10.4 -12.5  -0.8  -8.8  -6.7  -9.9  -8.7 
Memo items:                 
Agriculture and mining                 
Grains and crops  3.6  7.7 -1.6 -0.1 -0.5 -1.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2  -0.9  -0.6 
Forestry and fishing  3.9  3.7  -1.4 0.7 0.3  -0.1 1.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 -0.6  0.5 
Mining  -2.3  6.8  -1.3 0.0 0.3  -0.6 0.5 3.0 1.0 1.8  1.4 -0.3 
Utilities and services                 
Utilities and construction  3.3  -2.4 5.8 1.3 5.4 5.7 4.2 1.5 3.8 4.4  8.8  5.2 
Trade and transport  1.6  -1.5  0.3 -0.2 -0.6  0.4 -0.2 -0.8 -0.5 -0.1  0.3  0.1 
Commercial services  1.6  -0.6 -0.2 -0.5  0.4  0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -0.9  -0.8  -0.3 
Other services  8.6  -5.7  0.4 -0.3  0.3 -0.2 -0.7  0.2 -0.4  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
Source:  Author’s calculations, based on GTAP simulations; and UNIDO, Industrial Statistics database, CD-ROM 2009. 
Note:  The data in the table refer to percentage changes in the demand for unskilled labour relative to 2008. The percentage
changes in the demand for skilled labour are very similar, and thus are not shown. Industrial goods are listed by
increasing labour intensity, measured as the unweighted world average of the share of wages and salaries in sectoral
value added during the period 1995–2005.  
  nes = not elsewhere specified.  
a  Excluding the Republic of Moldova.   26 
The adverse effects of global rebalancing for trade flows and employment generation in industrial 
sectors reported above would be mitigated if other surplus economies, particularly Germany, were also 
rebalancing. Ongoing stagnation of private consumption in Europe and the tendency to embark on 
perhaps premature fiscal consolidation programmes strongly reduces the probability of such a scenario 
to occur. Nevertheless, it may be useful to examine the trade and employment effects that would result 
if in Germany the share of consumption in GDP increased by 10 percentage points and reached the 
historic level in the United States of about 66 per cent. This increase in Germany’s consumption 
would compensate the second half of the decline in United States consumption, i.e. the part of that 
decline which would be left uncompensated by the increase in China’s consumption.
30 Contrary to the 
bilateral rebalancing scenario examined above, it may also be assumed that such a multilateral 
rebalancing would not reduce the rate of GDP growth in the United States.
31 
On these assumptions, Germany’s trade balance would deteriorate by more than 10 percentage points 
of GDP to reach a deficit of about 5 per cent of GDP.
32 This outcome is unlikely to be acceptable for 
Germany’s policymakers.
33 Nonetheless, this scenario helps to illustrate the effects of global 
rebalancing that occurs in a multilaterally coordinated way and involves both the major deficit 
country, i.e. the United States, and major surplus countries, i.e. China and Germany. In this setting, 
adjustment in Germany could be sizeably reduced, and the adjustment burden made more acceptable, 
if other developed country surplus economies, such as Japan, also contributed to global rebalancing in 
such a way that the decline in United States consumer demand would be fully compensated by an 
increase in consumer demand in the surplus countries. 
To highlight the differences between bilateral and multilateral rebalancing, it is useful to compare the 
impact on trade flows and employment generation of such a multilateral rebalancing scenario, which 
are shown in figure 14, with those resulting from rebalancing confined to China and the United States, 
which was discussed above (figure 13). Multilaterally coordinated rebalancing would lead to a smaller 
decline in world exports of industrial goods (as indicated by the fact that the data points in the bottom 
half of figure 14 are closer to the horizontal axis than those in figure 13) and the most adversely 
affected industrial sectors would not regard the traditional labour-intensive export sectors of 
developing countries, such as apparel, leather and textiles. This means that a multilaterally coordinated 
rebalancing would sizeably reduce the adverse effects on export opportunities and employment 
creation in the industrial sectors of developing countries. 
 
 
                                                 
30 Given that Germany’s GDP is about one fourth that of the United States, this 10 percentage point increase in 
Germany’s share of consumption in GDP is about half of what would be required to compensate for the 
5 percentage decline in the United States’ share of consumption on GDP, assuming no change in the level of 
GDP in either country. Regarding China, see footnote 38 below. 
31 In any case, the effects of this assumption are small compared to those caused by changes in the shares of 
consumption in GDP. The estimation results that support this finding are available from the author on request. 
32 Overall, this scenario implies that countries’ trade balances deteriorate by about 0.7 percentage points of GDP 
less than in the scenario that confines rebalancing to China and the United States. This smaller decline is the 
combined effect of smaller increases in imports (about 1/3 of the total effect) and smaller reductions in exports 
(about 1/3 of the total effect). 
33 This shift also implies that the prices of primary factors in Germany would increase by about 7 percentage 
points more than in the group “Rest of EU-25 and EFTA”. Given that this group includes all those countries that 
in addition to Germany form the Euro-area, there is limited scope for exchange rate changes to bring about this 
adjustment. Hence, wages would need to increase significantly faster in Germany than in the other countries of 
the Euro-area.   27
Figure 14 
LABOUR INTENSITY AND GTAP SIMULATION RESULTS FOR CHANGES IN WORLD EXPORTS  
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Source:  See figure 13. 
Note:  See figure 13. 
 
 
However, in spite of the assumed full compensation of the decline in United States consumption by an 
opposite development in China and Germany, world exports of industrial goods would decline (as 
indicated by the fact that the majority of data points in figure 14 are below the horizontal axis). Indeed, 
as indicated above, the absolute level of consumer spending is only one element that determines 
consumer good imports. Another one is the similarity of consumer good imports across countries. 
While the basket of consumer good imports in Germany is fairly similar to that of the United States, 
this is not the case for China (figure 9). The perhaps most important element in this context regards 
differences in the import intensity of consumption and exports in different countries. As indicated 
above, in China the import intensity of exports is much larger than that of consumption, as well as 
much larger than that of United States exports. Hence, a rebalancing from exports to consumption in 
China and from consumption to exports in the United States would cause an overall decline in imports. 
The result of rebalancing in the United States and Germany would go in the same direction. The 
import intensity of consumption in the United States is about one half that in Germany, while the same 
proportion is about one third for exports, as already mentioned. This means that the combined effect of 
a shift from exports to consumption in Germany and a shift from consumption to exports in the United 
States would also be an overall reduction in imports.   28 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Cross-country differences in the rate of economic growth, as well as differences in the contribution of 
domestic consumption and exports to these growth rates, have played a key role in the accumulation of 
substantial current-account imbalances in the world economy. Such differences will also be of crucial 
importance for the reduction in global imbalances. 
Much of the debate on the causes of global imbalances, as well as on policies to be adopted for their 
reduction, has emphasized a bilateral perspective, focusing on China and the United States. One 
reason for this may have been that in these two countries important economic aggregates have 
developed in opposite directions: household consumption of a share in GDP increased in the United 
States but decreased in China, and trade accounts recorded sizeable deficits in the United States but 
surpluses in China. 
These developments, combined with the unprecedented boom of primary commodity prices between 
2002 and mid-2008, were of an overall expansionary nature. They contributed to sustained output 
growth in the world economy for several years in the lead-up to the current crisis. Equally important, 
the favourable external economic environment in the years before 2008 allowed output growth in 
developing countries to be relatively balanced in terms of sectoral contributions. In many of these 
countries, output growth in agriculture, extractive industries and services recorded rates almost as high 
as manufactured output. 
A reduction in global imbalances will have sizeable effects for the path of economic development in 
many developing countries. Simulations indicate that the net effect of a return to historic averages of 
the share of household spending in GDP in China and the United States for the world economy would 
be deflationary. This implies a deterioration of the external economic environment for developing 
countries. At the same time, adjustments limited to China and the United States would be insufficient 
for the unwinding of global imbalances. Adjustment will be necessary also in some other countries, 
particularly those with large external surpluses. The evolution of the current-account surpluses of the 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and other oil exporters has been determined largely by oil-price 
developments; besides, the size of these countries’ domestic demand is not large enough to influence 
global trade flows and employment creation. The import potential of other, relatively large, developing 
countries (such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa) is also relatively small, even when 
combined. And, in any case, in none of these countries has the current account been in surplus in 
recent years. Germany and Japan have been the two large developed countries that have recorded 
large, and more long-lasting, current-account surpluses. The large size of these two economies, the 
similarity between their basket of imported consumer goods and that of the United States, and the fact 
that domestic demand has grown notoriously slowly in these economies, would place them well for 
supporting the reduction in global imbalances. However, ongoing stagnation of private consumption in 
Europe, exacerbated by the tendency to embark on perhaps premature fiscal consolidation 
programmes, make it unlikely that any sizeable contribution in that direction will come from the 
European surplus economies. Nevertheless, simulations indicate that multilaterally coordinated 
rebalancing would reduce the adverse impact on trade flows and employment generation in industrial 
sectors. 
With regard to China’s increasingly important role as an engine of global growth, there is a risk that a 
shift from an investment- and export-led growth path to a more consumption-led growth path might 
imply sizeable adverse effects on the country’s rate of economic growth and employment creation. It 
might even imply an experience of prolonged economic stagnation, such as that of Japan during the 
1990s. Indeed, the current debate on global rebalancing and the associated trade- and currency-related 
tensions between the United States and China often takes up arguments that in many respects are 
reminiscent of similar tensions between the United States and Japan in the 1980s. These arguments 
point to the alleged undervaluation of the exchange rate; inflated asset prices, which are feared to 
eventually cause sharp declines in equity and real estate markets; overinvestment and excessive bank 
lending, which may result in non-performing loans and disruptions of the financial system (The   29
Economist, 2010). After the appreciation of the Yen following the Plaza agreement in 1985, Japan 
suffered deflation, stagnation, bank insolvency and excessive public deficits and debt that resulted in 
severe unemployment and detracted foreign investment. 
However, in spite of very rapid income growth over the past three decades, China today remains much 
poorer than Japan was in the 1980s and probably still has tremendous scope for internal development 
and a much higher long-term growth potential. This remaining greater room for catch-up growth, 
combined with its strong fiscal and external positions, would make it easier to recover even if China 
were to experience asset-price deflation and the ensuing economic problems that Japan has been 
experiencing over the past two decades. There are also indications that points to a gradual slow-down 
in the growth of China’s pool of surplus labour. This could cause real wage relative to productivity to 
increase faster than in the past, with attendant positive effects on household consumption and 
economic growth. 
As long as China’s robust growth trajectory remains in tact and investment in the country’s large 
infrastructure projects are pursued, its raw material imports are likely to remain strong as well. This 
will support direct exports to China, as well as put a floor under prices of primary commodities, 
especially energy and metals. Thus, countries for which buoyant exports of primary commodities were 
supporting rapid economic growth prior to the crisis are likely to experience only marginal adverse 
effects from global rebalancing. 
By contrast, developing countries in East and South-East Asia are likely to experience the greatest 
pressure for economic adjustment. An important pillar of their development strategies over the past 
two or three decades has been participating in global value chains that produce goods for consumption 
in developed-country markets, mainly the United States. Participation in these value chains by 
developing countries in East and South-East Asia has increasingly implied producing intermediate 
products for exports to China where they would be finished and shipped to the United States. 
Rebalancing in China will severely reduce the role of China as the world’s workshop of globally 
consumed goods, and rebalancing in the United States will severely reduce global demand for goods 
produced in such global value chains. Evidence for 2008 and 2009 in fact indicate that buyer-led 
global value chains, which are most prominent in consumer-good sectors, have undergone substantial 
consolidation. More importantly, in an overall shrinking market, this consolidation has implied an 
increase in China’s share in United States markets and a substantial loss in market share for East and 
South-East Asian producers, such as Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand (Milberg and Winkler, 2010). 
It is unlikely that East and South-East Asian developing countries will be able to replace the United 
States by other destination markets. The markets of other developing countries remain much smaller, 
and Chinese producers probably can satisfy the large Chinese markets through domestic production. 
European markets, which would be placed best to compensate falling imports from declining 
household consumption in the United States, are serviced by other global value chains that extent to 
Eastern Europe. Hence, developing countries in East and South-East Asia may need to follow 
economic rebalancing in China and reorient their development strategy towards a greater role of 
domestic demand as well. Successful policymaking in the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997 has 
shown that these economies can manage sizeable adjustments. But it is less clear whether this would 
allow them to maintain robust growth. Some of these economies are relatively small. And it has been 
widely recognized that exporting manufactures may provide dynamic development benefits that are 
difficult to attain through other activities (see, e.g. Korinek and Serven, 2010). Hence, global 
rebalancing may well require a general rethinking of development strategies. 
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ANNEX 1 
TECHNICAL NOTE ON THE SIMULATION OF THE TRADE AND  
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF GLOBAL REBALANCING 
The simulation employs the standard model of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) – a 
computable general equilibrium model of the global economy which emphasizes the role of 
intersectoral factor mobility in determining sectoral output supply, and which assumes output to be 
produced with constant returns to scale.
34 The model also assumes product differentiation between 
imported and domestic goods, and among imports from different regions. This assumption allows for 
two-way trade in each product category, depending on the ease of substitution between products from 
different regions. The model’s demand system allows for differential price and income responsiveness 
across countries. It also includes differences in import intensities across spending by economic agents 
(firms, households and governments) and across countries.
35 An assumed ‘global’ bank mediates 
world savings and investment. In addition to five production factors (land, capital, unskilled and 
skilled labour,
36 and natural resources), the GTAP database covers 113 countries (or regions) and 
57 product sectors, which for this simulation have been aggregated to 25 regions and 25 sectors (see 
tables 1 and 2). 
The simulation assumes:
37 (i) a 5 percentage point decline in United States consumption as a share of 
GDP (i.e. equivalent to the difference in 2008 between the actual share and the long-term average 
share as shown in figure 2 above); and (ii) a 7 percentage point increase in China’s household 
consumption as a share of GDP (i.e. equivalent to the decline between 2005 and 2008 as shown in 
figure 3 above).
38 In technical terms, conducting simulations based on these assumptions requires, for 
both the United States and China: (i) the variable ‘private consumption expenditure (yp)’ to become 
exogenous and the ‘private consumption distribution parameter (dppriv)’ to become endogenous; and 
(ii) the ‘savings distribution parameter (dpsave)’ to become exogenous and the ‘average distribution 
parameter shift (dpav)’ to become endogenous. These two modifications ensure that any change in the 
share of income used for private consumption will be reflected entirely in changes in the share of 
savings in income. 
 
                                                 
34 For documentation of the model, see Hertel (1997), and for the GTAP-7 database, see Narayanan and 
Walmsley, 2008. 
35 Broadly in line with what is discussed in section 4, the model’s demand system implies, for example, that the 
import intensity of government spending is lowest, followed by that of households, and then by that of firms, for 
which the import intensity is particularly large in countries with a high share of exports in GDP, such as those in 
East and South-East Asia. The model’s demand system also implies that the import intensity of consumption 
spending in the United States is two to three times larger than that in China, yet only about half to one third that 
in the member states of the European Union. 
36 In the GTAP-model, the split between skilled and unskilled labour is based on occupational data. Skilled 
labour refers to professional workers (managers and administrators, professionals and para-professionals), while 
unskilled labour refers to production workers (tradespersons, clerks, salespersons and personal service workers, 
plant and machine operators and drivers, labourers and related workers, and farm workers). The relationship 
between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers in the GTAP-model is determined on the basis of an 
econometric estimation, as explained in Dimaranan and Narayanan, 2008. 
37 Similar assumptions underlie the simulation exercise in Zhang, Zhang and Han (2010) who, however, use a 
different simulation model and focus on financial linkages rather than trade linkages which this chapter 
emphasizes. 
38 Given that China’s GDP is about one third that of the United States, this 7 percentage point increase in China’s 
share of consumption in GDP is about half of what would be required to compensate for the 5 percentage decline 
in the United States’ share of consumption on GDP, assuming no change in the level of GDP in either country.   31
The simulation further assumes: (iii) a reduction in the United States’ potential output by 1 percentage 
point relative to 2008 (i.e. the starting point of the simulation). This reduction is implemented by 
assuming a respective decline in output-augmenting technological change. The motivation for this 
assumption is that the decline in household consumption leads to a reduction in aggregate domestic 
demand in the United States. In the short term, this adverse demand impact may be limited by 
expansionary government spending which, however, in the medium term is unsustainable for fiscal 
reasons. Hence, over the medium term, the decline in household spending cannot be compensated in a 
sustainable manner by an increase in another element of aggregate demand. This slowdown in United 
States domestic demand, in turn, has spillover effects on other economies, since a greater emphasis on 
consumption-led growth relative to export-led growth in China and a shift in the opposite direction in 
the United States would reduce aggregate imports of these countries from the rest of the world. In 
other words, global rebalancing confined to adjustment in the United States and China would remove 
the demand stimulus that, prior to the outbreak of the current crisis, the United States was providing to 
the world economy without replacing it with a stimulus of similar size from increased consumption in 
China, as already mentioned in the main text. 
The GTAP model’s most updated database refers to 2004. Given that both global current-account 
imbalances and the share in GDP of consumption in China and the United States have changed 
significantly since 2004, the ratios of trade balances to income were updated to 2008 (i.e. roughly the 
onset of the current global economic and financial crisis). More precisely, each region’s current-
account balance as a share of income was updated on the basis of the respective growth rates between 
2004 and 2008, calculated from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. This was done by 
treating the change in the ratio of the trade balance on goods and services to regional income (dtbalr) 
as an exogenous variable, and the slack variable that represents the risk premium on investment 
(cgdslack) as an endogenous variable. These modifications cause investment to adjust such that it 
compensates for the assumed changes in the trade balance, thus ensuring that the savings-investment 
balance equals the trade balance. Given that the sum of all regions’ trade balances must be zero, so 
that dtbalr cannot be treated as exogenous for all regions, the trade balances of two groups (West Asia 
and North Africa and Rest of the World) were left to be determined endogenously. This methodology 
may be considered broadly equivalent to simulating a shock to real exchange rates. The simulation 
uses this updated database as the baseline scenario (i.e. the benchmark against which the impact of the 
assumed changes is measured). To test the robustness of the results obtained in this way, the 
simulation was run also on the original 2004 database with adjustment in United States consumption 
assumed to be equivalent to 4 percentage points and that in China’s consumption equivalent to 
5 percentage points. While the changes resulting from this alternative simulation are quantitatively 
smaller, partly because the underlying current-account imbalances in 2004 were smaller than in 2008, 
they are qualitatively identical. 
Simulations were undertaken for a scenario that assumes adjustments in the United States and China 
occur at the same time (the results of which are reported in the main text), as well as with a scenario 
that assumes adjustments occur separately in China and the United States. Doing so gives some 
indications as to the importance of adjustment in either of these two countries for global rebalancing. 
The results for the scenario in which adjustment is confined to China (table A1) indicate that the 
assumed increase in the share of China’s consumption in GDP would have a minor impact on trade 
flows for individual countries, except for China itself. They also indicate that the countries in East and 
South-East Asia taken together would benefit the most. This latter finding is probably due to the fact 
that these countries and China are part of the same international production networks, so that the 
simulated adjustments, helped by an appreciation of the renminbi by about 5 per cent, would imply a 
relocation of the exit point of these networks from China to other developing countries in the region. 
This finding also mirrors the results generally obtained from GTAP models that simulate an increase 
in China’s exports, where adverse effects are usually concentrated in the other Asian developing 
countries (UNCTAD, 2002: chapter V).    32 
 
Table A1 
GTAP SIMULATION RESULTS OF THE IMPACT OF REBALANCING IN CHINA ON TRADE FLOWS AND 
FACTOR PRICES, SELECTED COUNTRIES AND COUNTRY GROUPS 






























age points)   (Per  cent) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
China  -6.7  3.4  -14.6  2.9  2.8  4.8  4.3  6.4 
China, Hong Kong SAR  0.2  16.5  0.1  -0.3  -0.1  0.4  0.5  0.4 
China, Taiwan Province of  0.2  15.5  0.1  -0.2  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.1 
Indonesia  0.2  2.2 0.5  -0.2  -0.1 0.2  0.2 0.1 
Malaysia  0.3  44.3 0.0  -0.3  -0.1 0.1  0.0  -0.1 
Philippines  0.3  5.3 0.3  -0.3  -0.1 0.0  0.0  -0.1 
Republic  of  Korea  0.3  3.5  0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1  -0.2 -0.2 
Singapore  0.3  -0.6  0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2  -0.2 -0.2 
Thailand  0.7  10.3 0.6  -0.5 0.0 0.0  0.0  -0.1 
Rest of East and South East 
Asia  0.4  4.0 0.4  -0.4  -0.2 0.1  0.0  -0.2 
India  0.2  -6.3 1.1  -0.3  -0.1 0.0  0.0  -0.1 
South Asia, excl. India  0.2  -15.6  0.9  -0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1 
West Asia and North Africa  0.2  15.6  0.3  -0.3  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  -0.1 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.3  3.3  0.4 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1  -0.1 -0.2 
Argentina  and  Brazil  0.3  2.8  1.3 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2  -0.2 -0.3 
Mexico  0.2  0.2  0.7 -0.1  0.0 -0.1  -0.1 -0.2 
Rest of developing America  0.3  0.1  0.6  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2 
Canada  0.2  -0.8  0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1  -0.2 -0.2 
United  States  0.2  -4.4  1.4 -1.2 -0.4 -0.3  -0.3 -0.3 
Germany  0.3  6.0  0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2  -0.2 -0.2 
Rest of EU-25 and EFTA  0.3  -1.6  0.6  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  0.3  -0.1  0.9 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1  -0.1 -0.1 
Japan  0.4  1.4  2.0 -1.7 -0.7 -0.4  -0.4 -0.4 
CIS, excl. the Republic of 
Moldova  0.1  7.5  0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1  -0.1 -0.1 
Rest  of  the  world  0.3  -7.5  0.5 -0.2  0.0 -0.1  -0.1 -0.2 
Source: Author’s  calculations. 
Note:  All changes are relative to 2008. 
a  An improvement in the terms of trade indicates that the price of exports increased more (or fell less) than the price 
for imports.  
b  An appreciation indicates an increase in the price for primary factors, which may be likened to an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate.  
c  For the definition of skilled and unskilled labour and the wage ratio between skilled and unskilled labour, see 
footnote 36. 
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Given the relatively small overall impact of adjustment when confined to China, it is no surprise that 
the results for the scenario in which adjustment is confined to the United States (not shown) are 
similar to those for the scenario that assumes simultaneous adjustments in China and the United States, 
shown in table 1. The only major difference is that the impact on China’s trade balance in the scenario 
where adjustment is confined to the United States is much smaller than in the scenario in which 
adjustment occurs in both countries at the same time. The fact that the impact on China also is 
significantly smaller than for the vast majority of the other regions shown in table 1 suggests that the 
United States trade deficit is indeed multilateral in nature, rather than the result of bilateral trade flows 
between the United States and China. In terms of employment, these results suggest that rebalancing 
China’s growth trajectory will do little for other developing countries in terms of compensating for 
adverse effects stemming from adjustment in the United States. This is because China imports mainly 
intermediate goods (including parts and components), and primary commodities (primarily energy 
products and metals), which are not very employment intensive. 
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ANNEX 2 
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS ON THE CAUSES OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES  
AND THEIR REMEDIES 
The causes of global imbalances and policies to correct them have been the subject of numerous 
studies (for surveys see Mann, 2002, and Yu, 2007). Alternative views differ in how they look at the 
following accounting identity: 
CA = X - M + NFI = S
N - I = ΔNFA, 
where CA is the current-account balance, X and M are exports and imports of goods and services, NFI 
is the balance on income (net foreign incomes from abroad), S
N is national saving, I is national 
investment, and ΔNFA are changes in net foreign assets. The identity states that a country is running a 
current-account surplus when the sum of its trade balance (X-M) and its net foreign incomes (NFI) is 
positive. This implies an excess of national savings over national investment and an accumulation of 
net foreign assets. 
Three different perspectives on the current account may be distinguished on the basis of the above 
identity (Mann, 2002): (i) an international perspective which emphasizes the flows and holdings of 
financial assets and considers the current-account balance as being determined by the portfolio choices 
of private financial investors and official reserve holders that drive international capital flows; (ii) an 
international perspective which focuses on flows of trade in goods and services; and (iii) a national 
perspective which examines national income and product accounts, focusing on savings and 
investment, and sees the current account as driven by national savings-investment imbalances. Each of 
these three perspectives provides different lenses for an analysis of the accounting identity where one 
or the other perspective may be particularly useful under certain circumstances or time frames. 
Over the past few years, the most popular expression of the first perspective has been the ‘savings 
glut’ hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005). In this view, global imbalances are caused by savings decisions. 
More precisely, they result from a combination of demographics (i.e. the problem of aging populations 
in developed countries), rapid economic growth, high oil prices, and financial development which 
encourage savings outside the United States (mainly in East Asia, particularly Japan and China; oil-
exporting countries, mainly those in West Asia, but also Nigeria, the Russian Federation, and 
Venezuela; and some other countries, especially Germany). These savings flow to the United States 
because of the great diversity of financial assets and instruments available on its financial markets, the 
role of the dollar as an international currency, and the fact that United States financial assets represent 
“claims on a robust, innovative economy offering good returns, liquidity security and relative 
stability” (Cooper, 2008: 246). From this perspective, the large inflows of credit into the United States 
sparked a consumption boom and subsequent large current-account deficits. 
The second perspective emphasizes trade flow dynamics driven by United States and other countries’ 
income growth and changes in relative prices. Exchange rates play a key role in this perspective. The 
most important strand of this viewpoint sees the origin of global imbalances in the misalignment of 
real exchange rates, particularly between the dollar and East Asian currencies, resulting mainly from 
alleged “currency manipulation” by China for maintaining an undervalued renminbi. This view 
implies that the cause of the United States trade deficit is its bilateral deficit with China. However, 
there is little evidence for this contention, because prior to the current crisis the United States trade 
deficit had been increasing with every major region of the world. It may, therefore be described as a 
multilateral rather than a bilateral (United States versus China) phenomenon. Moreover, the strong 
divergence of per capita income levels between the two countries implies that the United States is no 
longer producing the goods that it imports from China. As a result, if it reduced imports from China, it   35
would probably have to replace these by imports from other, possibly higher cost sources, which 
would thus lead to an even higher trade deficit in the United States. 
Another strand within this perspective points to shortcomings in global economic governance. The 
absence of a global exchange-rate system, combined with widespread liberalization of capital flows, 
enabled developing countries to maintain their exchange rates at competitive levels in order to pre-
empt speculative attacks on their currencies. The resulting interventions on foreign-exchange markets 
resulted in the accumulation of vast foreign-exchange reserves, which were invested mainly in dollar-
denominated Treasury bills and which provided self-insurance against potential adverse effects from a 
sudden stop or reversal of capital inflows. To the extent that this self-insurance strategy is adopted by 
countries that are also pursuing an export-oriented development strategy, such as many countries in 
Asia, it will result in trade surpluses (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2004; Aizenman, 2007). 
These outcomes may appear to stem from developing countries’ development strategies, but in reality 
they are more likely due to shortcomings in global economic governance.  
The third perspective highlights patterns of domestic savings and investment as reflected in countries’ 
trade and current-account balances. Contrary to the previous perspective, it sees trade flows as being 
driven mainly by relative demand factors, rather than just by relative prices. In other words, it sees 
international trade in goods and services as responding, in a comparatively passive fashion, to 
domestic demand factors as reflected in national accounts. Cross-country differences in the rate of 
economic growth play an important role in this perspective. The link between domestic demand 
factors and international trade can be further examined considering that the above identity requires the 
ex-post equality of the savings-investment balance of the United States – or any other individual 





US S I I S − = −  
 
This indicates that an excess of investment over savings in the United States (i.e. a current-account 
deficit in the United States) must ex post be equal to the excess of savings over investment in the rest 
of the world (i.e. a current-account surplus of the rest of the world). National savings are the sum of 
government and private savings, where the latter can be further disaggregated in household and 
corporate savings (i.e. retained profits). 
A focus on the left-hand side of the equation designates a decline in national savings of the United 
States as the major cause of global imbalances.
39 Given that global imbalances have been perceived as 
a major issue only since about 2002 and that this date coincides with the beginning of the 
expansionary fiscal stance of the United States Government, the debate on global imbalances has 
sometimes centred on “twin deficits” – the simultaneous occurrence of fiscal and current-account 
deficits (Roubini and Setser, 2005).
40 
However, evidence of a statistically significant, long-term, positive co-movement of the budget and 
the current-account balances in the United States is tenuous (Cooper, 2008). Moreover, there is wide 
agreement that this relationship is weak in absolute terms. As noted by Bagnai (2009: 510), several 
studies (e.g. Chinn and Ito, 2007) indicate that a reduction of the fiscal deficit by one percentage point 
 
                                                 
39 A focus on the right-hand sight would be similar to the “savings-glut” hypothesis, which suggests that buoyant 
foreign demand for United States financial assets forces that country to live beyond its means. 
40 This year also marks the beginning of the depreciation of the dollar against most other major currencies, 
which, from the perspective of the “savings glut” hypothesis may be seen as a lower willingness of private and 
official holders of dollar-denominated assets to continue financing the United States current-account deficits. 
The associated risk that a diversification away from dollar-denominated assets occurring in a disorderly manner 
and causing a sharp dollar depreciation is what prompted concerns about the sustainability of global imbalances.   36 
of GDP leads to an improvement in the current account balance of only about one third of a percentage 
point of GDP. Accordingly, even if the United States had drawn down its fiscal deficit of about 3 per 
cent of GDP to zero prior to the current crisis, its current-account deficit of about 5.5 per cent of GDP 
would have shrunk by a mere 1 percentage point of GDP (other things being equal). In other words, an 
effective rebalancing of the United States savings-investment balance cannot occur without 
considerable involvement of the private sector in terms of interrupting the secular decline in its saving 
rate or, what is equivalent, interrupting the secular increase in its consumption rate. The opposite 
would hold for surplus countries.   37
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